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Abstract  
 
Purpose: The literature on the union wage premium is among the most extensive in labour 
economics but unions’ effects on other aspects of the wage-effort bargain have received much less 
attention. We contribute to the literature through a study of the union premium in paid holiday 
entitlements. 
 
Design/methodology: We examine the size of the union premium on paid holidays over time, with a 
particular focus on how the premium was affected by the introduction of a statutory right to paid 
holidays. Our data come from nationally representative surveys of employees and workplaces. 
 
Findings: We find that the union premium on paid holidays is substantially larger than the union 
premium on wages. However, the premium fell with the introduction of a statutory minimum 
entitlement to paid leave.  
 
Originality/value: Ours is the first study to examine explicitly the interaction between union 
representation and the law in this setting. Our findings indicate the difficulties that unions have 
faced in protecting the most vulnerable employees in the UK labour market. We argue that the 
supplanting of voluntary joint regulation with statutory regulation is symptomatic of a wider 
decrease in the regulatory role of unions in the UK.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Empirical studies of the impact of trade unions on the terms and conditions of employment have 
been one of the mainstays of labour economics for decades. Yet their scope is surprisingly limited, 
with the vast majority focusing on a single facet of the reward package, namely the hourly wage. A 
recent review of the evidence on this particular issue suggests that unions do still typically deliver a 
wage premium, at least in the US and UK, but that this premium has declined in magnitude in 
recent years (Bryson, 2014).  
The hourly wage is, however, only one consideration in determining the value of an employee’s 
overall compensation package. Many employees receive various forms of non-wage compensation 
or ‘fringe benefits’ in addition to their monetary wage and giving employees an entitlement to paid 
holidays may be viewed as one form of such compensation, alongside health insurance or sick pay. 
Alternatively, one may see it on the effort side of the bargain – as a reduction in the total number 
of hours an employee must work each year. Either way, empirical studies of union effects on this 
particular aspect of reward have been scarce. We are aware of only two published in the last 
decade: Faikh’s (2014) study for Canada and Goerke et al’s (2015) study for Germany.1  
We contribute to this literature through a study of the union premium in paid holiday entitlements 
in the UK over the period 1994-2017. Ours is the first study to provide estimates of the size of the 
union premium in the UK after 1998, and is the first to examine how any such premium was 
affected by the introduction of a minimum right to paid holidays in the late 1990s, and the 
extension of this right in the late 2000s. Our data come from a nationally representative survey of 
employees – the UK’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (ONS and NISRA, 2017) – and a nationally-
                                                     
1 Strictly speaking, however, Goerke et al’s study is one of take-up rather than entitlement.  
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representative survey of workplaces – the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills et al, 2014). 
We find that there is a trade union premium on paid holiday entitlements in the UK in 2017. 
When we compare the size of this holiday premium with the size of the union wage premium, we 
find that the holiday premium is proportionately around three times as large when estimated via 
directly-equivalent methods; however, it is of lesser value in monetary terms. Whilst we cannot 
claim that our results represent a causal effect of unions on paid holidays, our results are in line 
with theory and with other evidence of the positive effect of unions on terms and conditions.  
When we examine how the union holiday premium has changed over time, we find that the 
introduction of a statutory right to paid holidays, via the Working Time Regulations, led to a small 
reduction in the size of the union holiday premium, primarily because the Regulations reduced the 
share of non-union workers who received no paid holiday entitlement at all. Ours is the first study 
to examine explicitly the interaction between union representation and the law in this setting, and 
our findings indicate the difficulties that unions have faced in protecting the most vulnerable 
employees in the UK labour market. We argue that the supplanting of voluntary joint regulation 
with statutory regulation is symptomatic of a wider decrease in the regulatory role of unions in the 
UK.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical reasons as to why one might 
expect unions to affect the provision of paid holidays and also reviews the existing evidence. 
Section 3 outlines the policy context surrounding holiday entitlements in the UK. Section 4 
describes our data sources and estimation methodology. Section 5 presents our results and Section 
6 concludes.  
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2. THEORY AND PRIOR EVIDENCE 
Theory suggests that unions might affect the provision of paid holidays in two ways. The first 
arises if unions have some monopoly over the labour supplied to a firm and seek to utilise this 
power to increase the provision of paid holidays above the market-clearing rate, in the same way 
as they might for the pecuniary element of the overall compensation package. The second route 
arises if unions use their collective voice to bring about a change in the balance of compensation 
in favour of greater paid holiday entitlements (perhaps at the expense of money wages). Such an 
outcome may occur if unions follow a median voter model, in which they seek to persuade the 
employer to meet the preferences of the average member, rather than those of the employee on 
the margin of quitting the firm.2  
Evidence of whether unions do in fact raise the provision of paid holidays is sparse. Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) were the first to study the union holiday premium: their results were quite 
equivocal. They found no association between unionisation and the probability that a firm gave a 
non-zero entitlement to holidays, but they did find that, among firms making some provision, 
unionised firms spent more (thus implying higher levels of vacation pay). In individual-level data 
(from the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey), they found that unionised blue-collar workers 
actually had a lower probability of receiving paid vacations than similar, non-union workers. 
Subsequent investigations have been universal in finding positive union premia, however.  
Green and Potepan (1988) used data from the 1979 US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
and found that union membership had a substantial positive influence on the length of paid 
holidays for US workers, ranging from +11 per cent for those with 1-2 years’ tenure to +42 per 
cent for those with 15 or more years’ tenure. They used this result – in conjunction with the 
                                                     
2 The demographics of union membership and employee turnover suggest that the average member is likely to be 
somewhat older than the marginal employee; they may thus favour additional leisure time with family over a 
higher money wage. 
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relatively low rate of unionisation in the US – to help explain why the average amount of paid 
holiday in the USA was lower than the average in Europe at the time. Altonji and Ursui (2007) 
subsequently used PSID data for the period 1975-91 and, again, found a positive union 
membership premium on the length of paid holidays for the USA. 
Green (1997) was the first to study the impact of unions on employees’ entitlements to paid 
holidays in Britain. Using data from the UK’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) 1993, he 
estimated that the average employee was more likely to have some paid holiday entitlement in a 
unionised workplace than in a non-union one and, conditional on receiving some paid holiday, 
received an entitlement that was 2.5-4.5 days longer (implying that the average non-union 
employee worked around 1-2% longer each year). The union premia equated to between 13 per 
cent and 26 per cent, depending on gender and manual/non-manual status and were thus 
substantially larger than estimates of the union wage premium at the time.  
The situation in Britain was subsequently studied again using individual-level data by Bryan (2006) 
and using workplace-level data by Budd (2004). In common with Green, Bryan used data from the 
QLFS, but focused on the year 1997, just prior to the introduction of the Working Time 
Regulations (WTR). He showed that, among full-time employees, having your pay and conditions 
subject to an agreement between your employer and a union was associated with an additional 
holiday entitlement of 1.6 days on average, after controlling for other factors. Budd’s study used 
data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), conducted at the onset of the 
WTR, and found that workplaces that recognised unions were 18 percentage points more likely 
than non-recognised workplaces to offer at least four weeks of paid annual leave.  
The most recent study of the union premium on holiday entitlements, prior to our own, is that of 
Fakih (2014) using linked employer-employee data for Canada from 2005. Although the union 
premium on paid holidays was not the main focus of the study, Fakih showed that employees 
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covered by a collective bargaining agreement enjoyed an additional one day of paid holiday 
entitlement, on average, when compared with employees not covered by union bargaining.  
These studies estimate the direct effect of union representation via comparisons between union 
members and non-members, or between those employees who are covered by collective 
bargaining and those who are not. Unions can affect provision in other, indirect ways, however. 
First, their actions in unionised firms may have a threat effect on provision in non-union firms, if 
the latter raise their employees’ holiday entitlements to dampen the desire for union organisation. 
Second, unions may lobby for regulation that introduces minimum standards. The former arises 
from a position of union strength, and the latter arguably from a position of relative weakness 
(since unions in the UK have traditionally preferred voluntary to statutory forms of regulation). 
However, both have the potential to raise entitlements outside unionised workplaces, implying 
that the full effects of unions on holiday provision may be larger than has typically been estimated. 
These broader effects are, nevertheless, difficult to quantify.  
Finally, Budd (2004) notes that there may be a ‘facilitation’ effect of unions on employees’ 
awareness of their entitlements to paid holidays. Non-awareness of rights to paid holidays is still 
an issue in the UK some 20 years after the introduction of the WTR (Metcalf, 2018) and survey 
evidence points to the positive role that unions can play in raising employees’ general awareness of 
employment rights (Fevre et al, 2009: 14-16). This may have two implications. First, it may mean 
that non-union employees are more likely to under-report their true entitlements in response to 
survey enquiries (thus potentially biasing the observed union premium upwards). Second, it could 
imply that non-union employees are less likely to take holidays from work (since they may be less 
aware that such time should be paid by their employer).  Goerke et al (2015) find that union 
members in Germany take almost one extra day of holiday per year than non-members (a 
premium of around 3 per cent). There are no equivalent studies for the UK, however, since UK 
surveys focus on entitlements rather than actual take-up.  
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We examine entitlement to paid holidays, using data from the QLFS (as previously used by Green 
(1997) and Bryan (2006)) and WERS (as previously used by Budd (2004)). In each case, we look 
beyond a single year of data, both to deliver evidence on the magnitude of any union premium at 
the latest-available time point and to examine changes in the premium over time. Ours is the first 
study to provide estimates of the size of the union premium in the UK after 1998, and the first to 
examine how any such premium was affected by the introduction (and subsequent extension) of a 
minimum right to paid holidays in the UK. We focus on the effect of workplace unionisation, 
ignoring the broader effects that may occur via lobbying and the like, although we comment 
briefly on those in the conclusion. 
3. POLICY CONTEXT 
Before going further, it is worth pausing to outline the context around union representation and 
the provision of paid holidays in the UK.  
The UK operates a largely voluntarist system of employee representation in which unions’ 
bargaining power vis a vis employers is largely predicated on a strong membership base within 
individual organisations. Though some sectoral bargaining persists, it is rare, meaning that few 
employees benefit from collective bargaining unless their employer has agreed to enter into direct 
negotiations with a union that has recruited members among the employer’s workforce (termed 
‘union recognition’). The introduction of a statutory right to union recognition in 1999 has had a 
limited effect on the coverage of collective bargaining, since it is predicated on the union being 
able to demonstrate that it has employees’ support, but unions have found it difficult to organise 
outside their traditional areas of strength (Kersley et al., 2006: 117-122) There are no ‘free-rider’ 
provisions which would compel employees covered by collective bargaining to join a union.  
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In the absence of a collective agreement, the terms and conditions governing an employee’s job 
are thus typically the subject of negotiation between the employer and the individual employee, 
with the necessary caveat that legislation sets down minimum standards in specific areas.  
Employees’ entitlements to paid holidays are governed in the UK by the Working Time 
Regulations. These regulations stem from the European Working Time Directive and entered UK 
law on 30th July 1998 under the Labour government of Tony Blair. The provisions within the 
regulations came into force on 1st Oct 1998, at which point employees in the UK enjoyed a legal 
right to paid holidays for the first time. The regulations initially entitled a worker to three weeks of 
paid leave in 1998, increasing to four weeks in 1999. The four weeks equated to 20 days for a full-
time worker working five, six or seven days per week, and comprised 12 working days plus the 
eight statutory bank holidays. Part-time employees were covered by a pro-rata arrangement, 
which, in simple terms, equated to 4 days for each day that the employee worked each week; 
someone working three days per week would thus receive an annual entitlement of 12 days.3 
Whilst a derogation enabled employees in the UK to opt-out of other aspects of the regulations – 
specifically the 48-hour limit on weekly working hours – there was no such provision for 
employees to opt out of the entitlement to paid holidays. 
After being lobbied to exclude the eight bank holidays from the statutory entitlement, the Labour 
government of Gordon Brown later enacted the Working Time (Amendment) Regulations 2007. 
These increased the minimum entitlement for full-time staff to 24 days from 1st Oct 2007 (or 4.8 
days for each day worked, again up to a maximum of 5 days per week). The entitlement rose again 
to 28 days on 1st April 2009 (5.6 days per weekday worked).  
                                                     
3 The exact amount of leave entitlement in this introductory period, and when exactly coverage began for 
particular workers, depended on the timing of firms’ leave years. The regulations excluded various transport 
sectors, work at sea, trainee doctors, and parts of the armed forces and police. 
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The Labour Party, now in opposition, has recently repeated a call – first made in its 2017 General 
Election campaign – for four extra bank holidays.4 If enacted, this would raise the minimum 
entitlement still further, to 32 days for a full-time worker.  
4. DATA AND METHODS 
The UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
The QLFS is a quarterly general population survey of around 40,000 households, focusing on the 
labour market status and activities of each household member. The survey is administered by the 
UK’s Office for National Statistics and provides many of the UK’s official indicators of labour 
market activity. We use survey data from employees in Britain aged 18-74 who hold a permanent 
contract, giving us an annual sample of around 20,000 employees. Younger and older employees, 
and those on temporary contracts, are excluded from our analysis. Such workers are more likely to 
be employed on a casual basis where receipt of paid holidays is less formalised – indeed around 
two-fifths of those on temporary contracts report that they receive no holiday entitlement at all. 
Our sample includes full-time and part-time employees; we exclude the self-employed.  
We use the QLFS data to define three measures of holiday entitlement. First, we study the 
probability that an employee receives any paid holiday entitlement; second, we study the size of 
any entitlement (in days); and, third, we study whether the employee’ entitlement is above the 
statutory minimum. It has been traditional in the literature to study only the first and second of 
these. Entitlement is measured via a question which asks about the number of days of paid holiday 
that the employee is entitled to in their main job.5 To convert this to a metric which is comparable 
across employees with different annual working hours, we use data from a question which asks the 
number of days that the employee typically works in a week, and compute a measure of the annual 
                                                     
4 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-43860415 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39682388  
5 There are no questions about holiday entitlements in second jobs.  
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number of paid holidays that the worker would receive for each day that they work in a standard 
work-week (thus mirroring the way that entitlements are conceived within the Working Time 
Regulations). In keeping with the regulations, we cap the working week at five days. Accordingly, 
an employee who works 2.5 days per week and has an annual holiday entitlement of 15 days would 
– if employed continuously throughout the year – in effect earn six days of annual holiday 
entitlement per work-day under our metric (just above the current statutory minimum of 5.6 
days).6  
Our data series begin in 1994, this being the first year of currently-available QLFS data to contain 
measures of holiday entitlements, and ends in 2017, the latest year of data available at the time of 
writing. Examination of the annual data revealed an unexplained one-year dip in reported holiday 
entitlements in 2009, but the trend in the union premium appears unaffected. We thus interpolate 
the 2009 time point in our descriptive charts, but retain the year in our multivariate analysis.  
In each year, we run a series of regressions to identify the partial correlation between various 
measures of union representation and each of our measures of holiday entitlement. We first use a 
probit estimator to examine the probability that an employee is in receipt of any holiday 
entitlement and then estimate the size of that entitlement among those who receive some paid 
holidays via ordinary least squares regression. We then estimate the size of entitlements among all 
employees (i.e. including those who receive no entitlement) via a tobit estimator, censored at zero 
(the approach originally taken by Green (1993)). Finally, we estimate the probability that the 
employee receives an entitlement above the statutory minimum via probit. 
                                                     
6 Our approach does not account for part-time employees whose working day is less than a full-time employee in 
the same firm. Such employees would, under the regulations, get a statutory holiday entitlement on a pro-rata 
hours basis (i.e. their weekly contracted hours / full-time weekly contracted hours in their firm). We do not have 
information on the number of full-time contracted weekly hours in the firm, and so we are forced to ignore this 
nuance. The entitlements of part-time workers may thus be biased upwards to a small degree.  
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We utilise two measures of unionisation: whether the employee is a member of a trade union, 
which is available from 1994 and referred to hereafter as ‘union membership’; and whether the 
employees’ pay and conditions are directly affected by agreements between their employer and a 
trade union, available from 1996 and referred to hereafter as ‘union coverage’. We also interact the 
two, in order to identify non-members who are covered by union bargaining (so-called ‘free-
riders’) and union members not covered by bargaining (who might feasibly benefit from better 
holiday entitlements than non-members if their union membership gives them knowledge or 
resources to assist them in their individual negotiations with an employer). It should be noted that 
union coverage is considered to be under-reported in the QLFS by around one half (with Davies’ 
(2016) estimates putting coverage at 29 per cent in the 2012 QLFS, compared with 46 per cent in 
the 2012 Understanding Society dataset and 49 per cent in the 2011 WERS (Davies, 2016: Table 
2)). This measurement error will bias any estimates of the holiday premium deriving from union 
coverage downwards. There are no such concerns about the QLFS estimates of union 
membership, with these being very similar to those obtained from other surveys; indeed, the 
QLFS is the basis for the UK’s official statistics on trade union membership density (e.g. 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2018).7  
In order to estimate the association between holiday entitlements and unionisation independent of 
other factors, we control for a range of other employee, job and employer characteristics. The 
employee characteristics comprise: gender; age (and its square); and a four-category measure of 
educational attainment. Job characteristics comprise: whether the employee’s occupation is 
manual; full or part-time hours; and the number of days usually worked each week. Employer 
characteristics comprise: whether the workplace has 25 more employees; private or public sector; 
industry sector (12 dummies); and region of workplace (20 dummies). All analyses are weighted, 
                                                     
7 There may be a small downward bias in the QLFS estimates of union membership due to under-reporting by 
proxy respondents, but the degree of bias is estimated to be small – in the order of 1 percentage point (Department 
for Business Innovation and Skills, 2013). 
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using the sampling weights provided with the QLFS dataset and standard errors account for the 
use of variable probability sampling in the survey design. 
The Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
The WERS is a linked employer-employee survey which provides nationally representative data on 
workplaces in Britain with five or more employees. The strength of the survey lies in the richness 
of data collected on workplace policies and practices. The survey has been carried out on six 
occasions since 1980, but we utilise data from the three latest waves, conducted in 1998, 2004 and 
2011; these are the only waves to ask about the provision of paid holidays. We use data from the 
Survey of Managers, in which the manager responsible for employment relations at the workplace 
is asked (among other things) whether employees in the largest non-managerial occupation at the 
workplace are entitled to a specified amount of paid holiday. The amount specified was “more 
than four weeks of paid annual leave (excluding public holidays)” in 1998 and 2004, and “more 
than 28 days of paid annual leave (including public holidays)” in 2011. The 2004 and 2011 
questions thus focus specifically on the provision of paid holidays above the statutory minimum 
that applied at the time of the survey. 
We use the WERS data to check whether any association with unionisation that is evident in our 
analysis of the QLFS might be the result of omitted workplace characteristics since these are less 
extensively measured in the QLFS employee-level survey. Our results extend those of Budd (2004) 
to the latest WERS.  
We use a probit estimator to estimate the probability that a workplace offers the specified level of 
holiday entitlements to its non-managerial employees. The probit includes a dummy to identify the 
presence of recognized unions (akin to the measure of union coverage that we use in our analysis 
of the QLFS, but without the attendant concerns over under-reporting). We control for a set of 
firm characteristics shown to be informative in the previous literature, comprising: workplace size 
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(5 dummies); industry sector (11); region (10); whether single-site or multi-site firm; private or 
public sector; workplace age (5 dummies); the occupation of the largest non-managerial group at 
the workplace (7); the shares of employees that are female, from ethnic minority groups, aged 16-
21, aged 50 or more; the share of employees working part-time hours; whether the workplace 
employs a specialist human resource manager; whether the workplace is accredited as an Investor 
in People; and, finally, the responding manager’s subjective rating of the workplace’s labour 
productivity relative to others in it industry sector (4 dummies).  
Analyses are weighted by the WERS workplace sampling weights and standard errors account for 
the use of variable probability sampling in the survey design. 
5. THE UNION PREMIUM ON PAID HOLIDAY ENTITLEMENTS IN 2017 
We begin our analyses by focusing on the provision of paid holiday entitlements in 2017 – the 
latest year of QLFS data available to us. In 2017, some 97 per cent of permanent employees in 
Britain aged 18-74 reported at least some paid holiday entitlement.8 The mean entitlement among 
those who report some paid holidays was 5.7 days for each weekday worked: just above the 
statutory minimum. Once those reporting zero entitlements are included, the mean falls to 5.5 
days for each weekday worked, with the median worker reporting an entitlement of 5 days. The 
average worker’s entitlement thus falls just short of the statutory minimum.9 Some 30 per cent of 
employees have an entitlement that is estimated to be above the statutory minimum.  
                                                     
8 It is no surprise that this figure does not reach 100 per cent. Clark and Herman (2017) estimate that £1.8 billion 
of holiday pay goes unpaid in the UK each year; non-receipt of holiday pay entitlements is also a key focus for the 
Director of Labour Market Enforcement, who notes that a substantial minority of employees are unaware of their 
right to paid holidays (Metcalf, 2018: 104-8). Many of those who report zero entitlements in our data work part-
time. 
9 It is possible that we under-state entitlements to a small degree, however, since we do not account for the lower 
annual hours of those who work less than a full day on those days that they work – see Section 3.  
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Simple cross-tabulations of holiday entitlement by union membership status show that union 
members were 2.5 percentage points more likely than non-members to have some paid holiday 
entitlement in 2017. Among those employees who have some entitlement, union members’ 
entitlements were 1.4 days greater than non-members’. Combining the two figures gives union 
members an overall advantage of 1.5 days, averaged across all employees in our population. In 
2017, union members were 28 percentage points more likely than non-members to have an 
entitlement that was above the statutory minimum of 5.6 days per weekday worked. Model 1 in 
Table 1 shows these bivariate estimates for union membership: see columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 for the 
bivariate estimates without controls. Columns 2, 4, 6 ad 8 then go on to present the equivalent 
marginal effects of union membership after accounting for observed differences between union 
members and non-members in respect of employee, job and workplace characteristics. In these 
models, union members retain an advantage over non-members, but the adjusted premia are 
around half the size of the unadjusted premia, broadly speaking. Once the observed differences 
are taken into account, union members were 1.5 percentage points more likely than non-members 
to have a non-zero entitlement in 2017 (column 2, Table 1); their average entitlement was around 
two-thirds of a day larger in cases where some holiday entitlement was reported (column 4), giving 
an overall difference of around three-quarters of a day between members and non-members 
(column 6). Finally, union members were 12 percentage points more likely than non-members to 
receive an entitlement above the statutory minimum. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
As noted in Section 3, we have a second measure of unionisation, which identifies whether the 
employees’ pay and conditions are directly affected by agreements between their employer and a 
trade union (‘union coverage’). Intuition may suggest that this is a more direct measure of union 
influence, as one might expect any holiday premium to arise through collective bargaining; 
however, measurement errors in the QLFS are likely to bias any associated coefficients towards 
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zero. In fact, union coverage is associated with a 2.2 percentage point increase in the probability of 
entitlement: an effect that is at least as large as that associated with membership (Model 2, column 
2, Table 1). Elsewhere (columns 4, 6 and 8), the union coverage premium is positive and 
statistically significant but smaller than the union membership premium.  
Model 3 of Table 1 combines the two indicators to form a more detailed measure of union status 
which seeks to identify uncovered members and free-riders. Here, we find that all forms of union 
status deliver premia over fully non-union employees. However, it is the combination of 
membership and coverage that delivers the largest benefits. Model 4 of Table 1 then presents a 
final specification in which the three unionised categories from Model 3 are collapsed into one, 
thus identifying employees who are either union members or covered by union bargaining (or 
both).  Under this all-encompassing measure, unionisation (whether derived from membership or 
coverage) raises the probability of any paid holiday entitlement by 1.9 percentage points, raises the 
average entitlement across all workers by 0.62 days per weekday worked, and raises the probability 
of extra-statutory entitlement by 11.7 percentage points.  
The magnitude of the union membership premium on paid holiday entitlements can be put into 
context through a comparison with the union wage premium, estimated from the same data via 
equivalent methods. An OLS regression, in which the log of employees’ gross hourly wage is 
regressed on the union membership/recognition dummy from Model 4 in Table 1, along with our 
standard set of controls, yields a union wage premium of 4 per cent in 2017. Mean hourly wages 
among our population in 2017 equate to £15.11 per hour, implying a monetary premium of 
around 60p per hour for union members and those covered by union bargaining. This equates to 
around £1,000 per annum for a full-time worker.10 Model 4 in Column 6 of Table 1 shows that 
the union membership/recognition premium on paid holidays is worth 0.62 days per week-day 
                                                     
10 We assume a 37.5 hour week and sum over 46.5 weeks (assuming 5.5 weeks unpaid holiday). 
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worked. Mean entitlement among our population in 2017 is 5.50 days per weekday worked. The 
union premium is therefore adding 11 per cent at the mean: almost three times as much as unions 
add to wages, in proportionate terms. It implies an extra three days of paid holiday per annum for 
a full-time worker (30.5 days versus 27.5 for an employee without union membership or 
recognition). This would be equivalent to around £340, or around one third of the union wage 
premium in monetary terms when summed over the year.11   
One might anticipate that firms, unions or employees might trade wages and fringe benefits off 
against each other to some degree when composing the total reward package (some unions might 
seek to maximise the monetary wage; others might seek to maximise fringe benefits). Indeed, 
research from Norway indicates that employees place greater worth on fringe benefits than their 
pecuniary value would imply, suggesting that trade-offs are likely (Dale-Olsen, 2006). In this case, 
there could be an unobserved correlation between the error terms of our regressions of holiday 
entitlements and wages, potentially biasing our estimates. In fact, when we estimate the models as 
seemingly-unrelated regressions (Zellner, 1962) we obtain very similar figures to those used above. 
 
Other research on the union wage premium has shown that the benefits of union representation 
are not experienced equally. For instance, the union membership wage premium is shown to be 
larger in the public sector than in the private sector (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010), with the 
origins thought to lie in the greater strength of public sector unions and the absence of overt 
product competition, which make it easier for unions to capture rents. Similarly, the premium is 
shown to be larger for women than men (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2010) or even restricted to 
women only (Bryson et al, 2016), with the hypothesis being that unions may help to drive out 
                                                     
11 To arrive at the figure of £340, we multiply the mean hourly wage by 37.5 and divide by five to obtain a mean 
daily wage, then multiply by three. 
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discriminatory behaviour by employers (e.g. by attaching wage rates to jobs rather than workers) 
which might otherwise drive the wages of unrepresented female employees downwards. With 
these prior results in mind, Table 2 goes on to show the size of the union holiday premium for 
different groups of employee. The table focuses on the average holiday entitlement across all 
workers and utilises the encompassing measure of unionisation (thus following the specification 
shown in Model 4, column 6 of Table 1). The results indicate that unionisation delivers a holiday 
premium for a variety of different types of employee: male and female; manual and non-manual; 
full-time and part-time; and in both the private and public sectors. The between-group differences 
in the union premia are not statistically significant from zero, however, with the exception of the 
contrast between male and female employees. In common with the prior evidence on the wage 
premium, the union premium on paid holidays is larger for women than for men, with the 
difference between the union premium of 0.78 days among women and the union premium of 
0.48 days among men being statistically significant from zero at the 1 per cent level.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
6. ESTIMATES OF CHANGES IN THE UNION HOLIDAY PREMIUM OVER 
TIME 
Estimates of the union wage premium suggest that it is now around one-third of the size that was 
observed in the mid-1990s (Forth and Bryson, 2015). In this section, we examine whether the 
union holiday premium has also declined over the past two decades, again using data from the 
QLFS. Of course, this period saw a major policy intervention in the form of the introduction and 
subsequent extension of the Working Time Regulations (summarised earlier in the paper). To the 
extent that the Regulations provided a minimum floor of entitlement for employees with 
insufficient bargaining power to secure such an entitlement by their own means, one might expect 
their introduction to have reduced the advantage experienced by unionised over ununionized 
employees. This is indeed what we observe.  
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Figures 1-5 show how holiday entitlements changed over the period 1994-2017. The figures are 
descriptive (that is, they show the mean entitlement without controlling for other observable 
differences between unionised and un-unionised employees) and unionisation is measured via 
membership, so as to allow for the longest time-series.12 In Figure 1, one observes a large 
reduction in the unadjusted union premium for any paid holiday entitlement, arising from a sharp 
increase in the proportion of non-members who have a non-zero entitlement. This occurs over 
the period 1998-2001 and thus coincides directly with the introduction of the Working Time 
Regulations. In Figure 2, the unadjusted union premium on the number of days of paid holiday 
(among those with some) is fairly stable in comparison, though there is an indication that it may 
have widened since the early 2000s by virtue of a faster rate of increase in entitlements among 
unionised workers. Figure 3 shows the unadjusted premium among all workers (i.e. including 
those with zero entitlement). Here we see the effect of the reduction in non-entitlement on the 
average entitlement over the late 1990s. Otherwise, the pattern is broadly that seen in Figure 2, as 
we would expect.  
[FIGURES 1-3 HERE] 
Figure 4 shows the full distribution of entitlements in 1994 and 2017. Both the union and non-
union distributions have shifted to the right, but the union distribution has primarily altered at the 
top end of the distribution, through an increase in the share of union members with relatively 
large entitlements of 8 or more days per weekday worked, whereas the non-union distribution has 
primarily shifted at the lower end, through a reduction in the share of non-members with very low 
entitlements of 4 days or less per weekday worked. Despite these shifts, the unadjusted difference 
between the shares of union members and non-members enjoying extra-statutory entitlements has 
                                                     
12 The indicator of union coverage was only introduced into the QLFS in 1996.  
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altered relatively little since the Working Time Regulations came fully into force, standing at 
roughly 30 percentage points in each year since 1999 (Figure 5).  
[FIGURE 4 AND FIGURE 5 HERE] 
To provide a more robust account of how the union premium has altered, we undertake annual 
regressions of the form presented in the previous section. Here, we utilise our preferred indicator 
of union status (counting membership or coverage) and thereby restrict our estimation period to 
1996-2017. The marginal effects of unionisation under this approach are presented in Figures 6-9.  
Figure 6 shows a dramatic decline in the regression-adjusted union premium on the probability of 
a non-zero entitlement during the late 1990s. As implied by Figure 4, this comes as the result of 
the Working Time Regulations pushing up the share of non-union employees with some 
entitlement to paid holidays; the union premium falls from around 5 percentage points before the 
introduction of the Regulations to around 1 percentage point soon after.  
[FIGURE 6 HERE] 
No further reduction is evident after the extension of the Regulations in 2007-2009: the main 
inroads into non-entitlement had already been made in 1999. Instead, Figure 6 indicates a slight 
re-widening of the union premium on non-zero entitlements from around 2008. This most 
probably reflects the impact of the recession, which seems to have had a greater depressing effect 
on non-union holiday entitlements – the line for union employees in Figure 4 is stable in 
comparison. Such a pattern would accord with evidence on the counter-cyclicality of the union 
wage premium (see Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004).  
In contrast to the sharp fall in the union premium on non-zero entitlements, the regression-
adjusted union premium on the number of days of paid holiday (among employees with some 
entitlement) is relatively stable over the period 1996-2017 (Figure 7). It averages out at around half 
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a day, with the minor downturn between 1997 and 2000 being fairly inconspicuous in the context 
of later year-on-year variations. When combined with the probability of any entitlement, however, 
it is clear that the overall union premium among all employees in our population fell by around 
one quarter, from 0.8 days per weekday worked in 1997 to 0.6 days in 2001 – a level at which it 
has broadly remained ever since (Figure 8).  
[FIGURE 7 AND FIGURE 8 HERE] 
The union advantage in the probability of extra-statutory provision has followed a similar path 
(Figure 9). The premium initially spiked upwards between 1998 and 1999, when the Working 
Time Regulations were first introduced, because many of those non-union employees who found 
themselves above the transitional introductory minimum of 3 days per weekday worked in 1998 
subsequently found themselves at or below the full minimum of 4 days in 1999 once the 
Regulations had been fully enacted. Thereafter, the union premium fell from around 15 percentage 
points in 1999 to around 12 percentage points in the early 2000s, a level at which it has broadly 
remained ever since.13 This then reinforces the view that the major change to union/non-union 
differentials in paid holiday entitlements came with the introduction of a statutory minimum 
entitlement at the end of the 1990s.  
[FIGURE 9 HERE] 
A set of conventional ‘difference-in-differences’ specifications which formally compare the size of 
the overall union premium on holiday entitlements either side of each of the two reform periods 
confirm this broad point.14 In the first case, we compare the size of the union premium on overall 
                                                     
13 The implication is that the revisions to the Regulations in 2007-2009 captured similar proportions of union and 
non-union workers.  
14 We undertake tobit regressions of overall holiday entitlements using the specification reported in Figure 8, but 
restrict our sample periods to the years just before and after each of the two reforms (1997 vs 2000/2011 and 
2005/2006 vs 2010/2011). Each specification includes a union dummy, a dummy for the ‘post-reform’ period and 
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entitlements in 1997 (just before the introduction of the WTD) with the size of the premium in 
2000/2001 (just afterwards) and find a statistically significant fall of 0.18 days per weekday 
(p<0.01). In contrast, when we compare the premium just before the extension of the WTD in 
2005/2006 with that just afterwards in 2010/2011, we find a marginal, non-significant increase of 
0.02 days per weekday (p=0.213).   
 
7. ESTIMATES OF THE UNION PREMIUM FROM WORKPLACE DATA 
As noted earlier, it is possible that these estimates of the union premia may be biased through our 
inability to observe more than just a narrow set of employer characteristics within the QLFS. We 
are unable to perform comprehensive sensitivity tests, due to the absence of a linked employer-
employee data with an employee-level measure of holiday entitlements. However, the WERS 
provides a workplace-level indicator of entitlements – as described in Section 3 – alongside a host 
of employer characteristics which can serve as controls.  
Our specification is similar to that of Budd (2004), except that we control for a wider set of 
human resource management practices in an effort to ensure that any union premium is not 
contaminated by an otherwise-unobserved association between unions and ‘high-road 
employment practice’. As a result, we obtain a lower premium in 1998 than that presented by 
Budd, but the premium is still substantial, standing at 12 percentage points, compared with Budd’s 
estimate of 18 percentage points. This was a period when the Working Time Regulations were in 
the process of being enacted. By extending the analysis to 2004 and 2011, we move to a period 
when the WERS questions focus explicitly on provision that is above the statutory minimum that 
applied at the time of either survey. We find union premia of around 17 percentage points in each 
                                                     
an interaction term derived from the two, alongside the standard set of controls. We do not include 1996 as some 
of the control variables have to be derived slightly differently in that year.  
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of those two years (see Table 3). The main takeaway here is that the union premia on extra-
statutory entitlements is both positive, and broadly of the same magnitude, in 2004 and 2011 when 
estimated on workplace data. This is in line with the picture of stability through the 2000s that has 
emerged from the QLFS.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Once studies of union wage premia have been set aside, there are relatively few studies of the 
effects of union representation on other aspects of the wage-effort bargain. We contribute to this 
small body of literature through a study of the union premium in paid holiday entitlements, using 
large-scale survey data for Britain covering the period 1994-2017.  
Union representation may raise the provision of paid holiday entitlements via two principal 
mechanisms. The first is via a ‘monopoly effect’ in which unions increase the ceteris paribus level of 
paid holiday entitlements through the articulation of bargaining power that, ultimately, resides in 
their ability to institute industrial action. The second is via a ‘collective voice effect’ in which 
unions shift the balance of total compensation towards the provision of longer paid holidays, 
perhaps at the expense of money wages.  
Whatever the mechanism at play (and we are unable to adjudicate with our data), we find that 
union members and those covered by union bargaining enjoy larger entitlements to paid holidays 
than non-union employees in Britain in 2017. Unionised employees are more likely to have a non-
zero entitlement, enjoy longer average entitlements where any are offered, and are more likely to 
enjoy entitlements that are above the statutory minimum. The union premium on paid holidays is 
substantially larger than the union premium on wages in proportionate terms, although it is less 
valuable than the wage premium in money terms. 
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Union representation is not the only way for employees to obtain a degree of control over their 
holiday entitlements, however. As Berg et al (2004) make clear in their study of working time, 
government regulations can also be influential and, in the absence of strong or pervasive union 
organisation (such as might be obtained from extensive multi-employer bargaining), statutory 
regulation can be more effective in securing a degree of equality across the labour market. In the 
British case, unions have long found it difficult to extend representation to some of the most 
vulnerable employees, such as those working short hours, those in small firms and those working 
for hostile employers. We find that the introduction of a statutory minimum entitlement to paid 
holidays via the Working Time Regulations in 1998/99 did indeed raise entitlements – or rather, 
reduced the chances of non-entitlement – for a minority of non-union workers, and reduced the 
union premium on paid holidays as a result.  
This is not to argue that unions had no role in the regulatory process. The Working Time 
Regulations – though originating from Europe – were enacted under a Labour government and 
the extension of the Regulations in 2007 to exclude bank holidays had its genesis in the Warwick 
Agreement that was struck between the Labour Party and a number of trade unions prior to 
Labour’s re-election in 2005. Nevertheless, the fact that the major shift in the union premium on 
paid holidays over the past quarter century in Britain has been a reduction in the premium, 
brought about by the introduction of statutory minimum standards, is, we would argue, indicative 
of state substitution of the union good at the very bottom of the labour market where unions have 
found it hardest to offer tangible protection. As Barbash (1987: 168) has previously noted, “if 
unionism is not performing the equity function, management and/or the state will pick up the 
slack”.  Ewing (2005) is one of those who have previously commented on the diminishing 
regulatory role of trade unions specifically within the UK labour market. The provision of 
entitlements to paid holidays would appear to be one case in point.  
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Table 1: Union premium on paid holiday entitlements, all employees, 2017: results for four model specifications 
 Any paid holiday 
entitlement 
Paid holiday 
entitlement per 
weekly days worked 
(exc. zeros) 
Paid holiday 
entitlement per 
weekly days worked 
(inc. zeros) 
Any extra-statutory 
entitlement 
 Probit (Marg. Eff.) OLS Tobit Probit (Marg. Eff.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model 1. Union member (ref. non-
member) 0.025** 0.016** 1.432** 0.674** 1.537** 0.766** 0.283** 0.121** 
 [6.93] [4.79] [32.87] [18.69] [33.30] [18.54] [45.13] [17.70] 
         
Model 2. Union recognition (ref. no 
recognition) 0.034** 0.022** 1.095** 0.364** 1.247** 0.475** 0.259** 0.095** 
 [8.55] [6.02] [27.31] [9.98] [29.19] [11.36] [39.89] [13.27] 
Model 3. Union status (detailed):  
(ref. non-member, no recognition) 
        
Member, no recognition 0.014** 0.010* 1.395** 0.612** 1.447** 0.659** 0.265** 0.111** 
 [2.74] [1.97] [18.46] [9.98] [17.97] [9.32] [24.24] [10.16] 
Non-member, recognition 0.027** 0.017** 0.708** 0.121** 0.841** 0.199** 0.211** 0.069** 
 [4.95] [3.37] [14.51] [2.61] [15.70] [3.72] [20.78] [6.89] 
Member, recognition 0.041** 0.030** 1.587** 0.746** 1.758** 0.897** 0.333** 0.152** 
 [8.04] [6.35] [29.88] [16.79] [31.62] [17.79] [44.02] [17.64] 
         
Model 4. Union member or recognition 
(ref. member, no recognition) 0.028** 0.019** 1.305** 0.521** 1.431** 0.621** 0.284** 0.117** 
 [8.41] [5.87] [36.21] [15.93] [36.62] [16.29] [50.53] [16.97] 
         
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations (model 4) 18,651 18,651 18,010 18,010 18,651 18,651 18,651 18,651 
Goodness-of-fit (model 4) 0.02 0.22 0.09 0.36 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.23 
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. Key to statistical significance: **<0.01; *<0.05. Control variables: gender, age, age squared, qualifications (4 
dummies), manual occupation, part-time, number of days worked per week, workplace with 25+ employees, private sector workplace, industry sector 
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(12 dummies), region of workplace (20 dummies). Goodness of fit statistics: columns 1, 2, 7 and 8: McFadden pseudo-R2; columns 3 and 4: adjusted-
R2; columns 5 and 6: McFadden’s adjusted-R2. 
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Table 2: Union premium on paid holiday entitlements, by type of employee, 2017 
 Paid holiday 
entitlement per 
weekly days worked 
(inc. zeros) 
 Tobit 
 Coeff. T-stat 
   
Male 0.484** 11.69 
Female 0.777** 11.64 
   
Manual 0.516** 7.22 
Non-manual 0.658** 14.44 
   
Female full-time 0.676** 10.46 
Female part-time 0.859** 5.92 
   
Private sector 0.566** 14.74 
Public sector 0.738** 7.67 
   
Notes: Union variable identifies membership or recognition. Key to statistical significance: 
**<0.01; *<0.05. Control variables: gender, age, age squared, qualifications (4 dummies), manual 
occupation, part-time, number of days worked per week, workplace with 25+ employees, private 
sector workplace, industry sector (12 dummies), region of workplace (20 dummies).  
 
Table 3: Marginal effect of union recognition on holiday provision for the largest non-
managerial occupation at the workplace, 1998, 2004 and 2011 
 1998 2004 2011 
    
Union recognised at the workplace 0.121** 0.165** 0.174** 
 [3.09] [3.55] [3.24] 
    
Controls? Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,966 1,881 2,151 
Pseudo-R2 0.27 0.22 0.19 
Notes: Workplaces with 10 or more employees. T-statistics in parentheses. Key to statistical 
significance: **<0.01; *<0.05. Control variables: workplace size (5 dummies); industry (11), region 
(10), single-site firm, private sector, workplace age (5), largest occupational group (7), workforce 
composition (% female, ethnic minority, part-time, aged 16-21; aged 50+), HR specialist, Investor 
in People, subjective rating of workplace labour productivity relative to industry (4). See text for 
the wording of the WERS questions on holiday entitlements, which vary between waves.  
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Figure 1: Proportion of employees with some paid holiday entitlement, by union 
membership, 1994-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Base: All permanent employees aged 18-74 in Britain. Note: 2009 interpolated. 
 
Figure 2: Number of days of paid holiday entitlement per weekly days worked (if non-zero 
entitlement), by union membership, 1994-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Base: All permanent employees aged 18-74 in Britain. Note: 2009 interpolated. 
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Figure 3: Number of days of paid holiday entitlement per weekly days worked (including 
zero entitlements), by union membership, 1994-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Base: All permanent employees aged 18-74 in Britain. Note: 2009 interpolated. 
Figure 4: Distribution of paid holiday entitlements per weekly days worked (including 
zero entitlements), by union membership, 1994 and 2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Base: All permanent employees aged 18-74 in Britain.  
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Figure 5: Proportion of employees with extra-statutory paid holiday entitlements, by union 
membership, 1998-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Base: All permanent employees aged 18-74 in Britain.  
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Figure 6: Marginal effect of union status on probability of any paid holiday entitlement, 
1996-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Dashed lines show 95% confidence interval.  
 
Figure 7: Marginal effect of union status on number of days of paid holiday entitlement 
per weekday worked (if non-zero entitlement), 1996-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Dashed lines show 95% confidence interval.  
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Figure 8: Marginal effect of union status on number of days of paid holiday entitlement 
per weekday worked (including zero entitlement), 1996-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Dashed lines show 95% confidence interval.  
Figure 9: Marginal effect of union status on probability of extra-statutory holiday 
entitlement, 1998-2017 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. Dashed lines show 95% confidence interval.  
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